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ABSTRACT
Should a social planner treat observationally identical persons identically? This paper shows that
uniform treatment is not necessarily desirable when a planner has only partial knowledge of
treatment response. Then there may be reason to implement a fractional treatment rule, with positive
fractions of the observationally identical persons receiving different treatments. The planning
problems studied here share some important features: treatment is individualistic, social welfare is
a strictly increasing function of a population mean outcome, and outcomes depend on an unknown
state of nature. They differ in the information that the planner has about the state of nature and in
how he uses this information to make treatment choices. In particular, I compare treatment choice
using Bayes rules and the minimax-regret criterion. Following the analysis, I put aside the literal
notion of a planner who makes decisions on behalf of society and consider the feasibility of








Should a social planner treat observationally identical persons identically?  The answer is positive
when treatment is individualistic and a utilitarian planner knows the population distribution of treatment
response (e.g., Manski, 2004, Section 2.1).  However, uniform treatment is not necessarily desirable when
a planner has only partial knowledge of treatment response.  Then there may be reason to implement a
fractional treatment rule, with positive fractions of the observationally identical persons receiving different
treatments.  Here is a simple, dramatic illustration.
Choosing Treatments for X-Pox: Suppose that a new viral disease called x-pox is sweeping the world.
Medical researchers have proposed two mutually exclusive treatments, say a and b, which reflect alternative
hypotheses, say Ha and Hb, about the nature of the virus.  If Ha (Hb) is correct, all persons who receive
treatment a (b) survive and all others die.  It is not known which hypothesis is correct but there is consensus
that Ha is correct with probability 0.3 and Hb with probability 0.7.
There are two singleton rules in this setting, one giving treatment a to the entire population and the
other giving b.  The latter rule, which implies that all of humanity survives with probability 0.7 and perishes
with probability 0.3, is preferable to the former one, which reverses these probabilities.  However, neither
singleton rule is necessarily better than a fractional rule in which a fraction . , (0, 1) of the population
receives treatment b and the remaining 1 ! . receive treatment a.  Under this rule, the fraction who survive
is . with probability 0.7 and 1 ! . with probability 0.3.  The fraction min(., 1 ! .) survives with certainty.
The optimal treatment rule depends on the social welfare function.  Let s(.) denote the survival rate
with allocation ..  Let social welfare be f[s(.)], where f(@) is strictly increasing.  Let the objective be to
maximize expected social welfare E{f[s(.)]} over . 0 [0, 1].  If f(@) is linear, Ef{[s(.)]} = 0.7. + 0.3(1 ! .)
and the optimal policy sets . = 1.  If f(@) is the log function, E{f[s(.)]} = 0.7log(.) + 0.3log(1 ! .) and the
optimal policy sets . = 0.7.   ~2
1 The reasons for fractional treatment rules studied in this paper all stem from partial knowledge of
treatment response.  There may be other reasons for fractional rules as well.  For example, aggregate resource
constraints may make it infeasible to assign the same treatment to the entire population.
The problem of treating x-pox illustrates how society can use a fractional treatment rule to diversify
a risk that is privately indivisible.  An individual cannot diversify; one receives treatment a or b and lives or
dies.  Yet society can diversify by having positive fractions of the population receive each treatment.
The x-pox problem also shows that society may not be able to rely on decentralized decision making
to achieve the social optimum.  If each person makes his own treatment choice, all will choose treatment b.
These decentralized choices are socially optimal if welfare is linear in the survival rate but they are not
optimal if welfare is the log of the survival rate or another concave function thereof.
The x-pox illustration is not an oddity.  This paper shows that there are many planning problems in
which partial knowledge of treatment response can makes a fractional treatment rule desirable.  The problems
studied here share some important features: treatment is individualistic, social welfare is a strictly increasing
function f(@) of a population mean outcome, and outcomes depend on an unknown state of nature.  They differ
in the information that the planner has about the state of nature and in how he uses this information to make
treatment choices.
1
Section 2 formally sets out the common features of the problems to be studied.  I introduce a special
case that I repeatedly consider throughout the paper, this being choice between a status quo treatment and an
innovation.  I also discuss the planner’s choice of a social welfare function.
Sections 3 through 5 examine three informational variations on the basic problem.  Section 3
supposes that the planner is Bayesian.  As in the x-pox illustration, the planner places a subjective probability
distribution on the unknown state of nature and maximizes expected social welfare.  The optimal treatment
rule is generically a singleton if the function f(@) is linear but may be fractional if f(@) is nonlinear.
Considering choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation, Proposition 1 gives a sufficient
condition for the optimal rule to be fractional.3
Section 4 supposes that the planner has no subjective or empirical information about the unknown
state of nature and that he chooses a treatment rule minimizing maximum regret.  In earlier work (Manski,
2005a, Chapter 2; 2005b), I have shown that the minimax-regret rule is fractional when there are two
undominated treatments, the function f(@) is linear, and partial knowledge of treatment response is a
consequence of a missing data problem.  Here I generalize this finding substantially.  Proposition 2 shows
that the minimax-regret rule is generically fractional in choice problems with two undominated treatments,
whatever the shape of f(@) and whatever the reason why knowledge of treatment response is incomplete.
Section 5 supposes that the planner has sample data on treatment outcomes and, following Wald
(1950), evaluates a treatment rule by its frequentist expected performance across repeated samples.  Manski
(2005a, Chapter 3) and Manski and Tetenov (2005) have analyzed choice between a status quo treatment and
an innovation when treatments have binary outcomes and when the data are the outcomes of an experiment
assigning a random sample of subjects to the innovation.  I summarize the findings here.
The concluding Section 6 puts aside the literal notion of a planner who makes decisions on behalf
of society and considers the feasibility of implementing fractional treatment rules in functioning democracies.
A possible legal/ethical impediment is the normative principle calling for “equal treatment of equals.”  A
possible political advantage of fractional rules is that they convexify the collective problem of treatment
choice—whereas discrete choice among singleton rules often is politically difficult, continuous choice among
fractional rules may be less contentious.
Throughout this paper, I maintain the simplifying assumption that the members of the population are
observationally identical.  If persons have observable covariates, the planner can differentially treat persons
with different covariates.  Many planning problems are separable across covariance values if the function f(@)
is linear; see, for example, Manski (2005a, Chapter 2).  In such cases, the analysis of this paper can be applied
independently to each subpopulation of observationally identical persons.  However, planning problems
typically are not separable if f(@) is nonlinear, and analysis becomes more complex.
I also maintain the simplifying assumption of a one-shot planning problem, which gives the planner4
no opportunity to learn through experience.  Situations that approximate one-shot problems, such as the x-pox
illustration, do occur in practice.  However, other planning problems play out over time, with the outcomes
of early treatment decisions informing treatment choice later on.  The possibility of learning introduces a
further argument for fractional treatment rules.  That is, observation of the outcomes experienced by persons
who receive different treatments today may enable society to learn about treatment response and, hence, to
improve treatment decisions tomorrow.  The randomized clinical trials of medical research exemplify this
reason for fractional rules.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Basic Concepts
The basic concepts are as in my previous research on social choice with partial knowledge of
treatment response (Manski , 2000, 2004, 2005a, 2005b), with one essential generalization.  I have previously
assumed that the planner wants to maximize a population mean outcome.  I now suppose that the planner
wants to maximize a strictly increasing function of this mean outcome.  This generalization is immaterial if
the planner knows the population distribution of treatment response, but it is consequential in settings with
partial knowledge.
The planner’s problem is to choose treatments from a finite set T of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive treatments.  Each member j of the population, denoted J, has a response function yj(@): T 6 Y
mapping treatments t 0 T into responses yj(t) 0 Y.  The socially relevant outcome from assigning treatment
t to person j is uj(t) / u[yj(t), t], where u(@, @): Y × T 6 R.  At the time of treatment choice, the planner knows
the form of u[yj(t), t] but does not know the value of its first argument yj(t).  For example, u[yj(t), t] may have
the “benefit-cost” form u[yj(t), t] =  yj(t) ! cj(t), where c(t) is the known real-valued cost of treatment t and5
2 Fractional treatment rules are randomized from the perspective of the population.  The planner
views the members of the population as observationally identical and, hence, must use some effectively
random mechanism to assign specific persons to treatments.  Thus, under rule z, each person j has probability
z(t) of receiving treatment t.
Fractional rules as defined here are not randomized in the decision theoretic sense of mixed strategies.
Rule z assigns fixed fractions of the population to the treatments in T.  A mixed strategy would have these
fractions be random, with their realizations determined by an auxiliary randomizing device.  Formally, a
mixed strategy is not an element of Z but rather an element of )Z, where )Z is the space of all probability
distributions on Z.
yj(t) is the unknown real-valued benefit of this treatment. 
The members of J are observationally identical.  A feasible treatment rule assigns all persons to one
treatment or fractionally allocates persons across the treatments.  Formally, let Z denote the unit simplex on
R
T; that is, the space of functions that map T into the unit interval and that satisfy the adding-up conditions:
z 0 Z  Y 3 t 0 T  z(t) = 1.  The feasible treatment rules are the elements of Z.  Rule z is singleton if, for some
t 0 T, it has the form [z(t) = 1, z(tN) = 0, œ tN … t].  Non-singleton rules are fractional.
2
The population is a probability space (J, S, P) and the probability distribution P[y(@)] of the random
function y(@): T 6 Y describes treatment response across the population.  The population is “large” in the
sense that J is uncountable and P(j) = 0, j 0 J.  For each treatment rule z, let U(z, P) / 3 t 0 T z(t)@E[u(t)] denote
the mean value of u realized under z.  I assume that the planner wants to solve the idealized problem
(1)                                                      max z 0 Z f[U(z, P)],
where the function f(@) is strictly increasing in its argument.  The solution is to assign the entire population
to a treatment solving the problem
(2)                                                        max t 0 T  E[u(t)].
The social welfare achieved by an optimal rule is6
(3)                                                  f
*(P)  /  f{max t 0 T E[u(t)]}.
Observe that the solution to the idealized planning problem does not depend on the specific form of the
function f(@), although the resulting social welfare does depend on f(@).
Researchers in public economics have studied many planning problems akin to (1), where members
of the population differ in unobserved respects and the planner knows the population distribution of treatment
response.  In particular, the literature on optimal income taxation spawned by Mirrlees (1971) permits persons
to differ in unobserved ability but assumes that the planner knows both the population distribution of ability
and how ability affects labor supply.  Similarly, studies of optimal income-maintenance programs (e.g.,
Besley and Coate, 1995), optimal disability benefits (e.g., Diamond and Sheshinski), and optimal criminal
justice systems (e.g., Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) suppose that the planner does not observe certain individual
attributes but does know both the population distribution of the unobserved attributes and how the attributes
affect behavior.
In contrast, I study treatment choice when the planner has only partial knowledge of the quantities
E[u(t)], t 0 T and, hence, cannot solve the idealized problem.  To formalize the idea of partial knowledge, let
' denote the set of states of nature that the planner deems feasible.  Then (P(, ( , ') are the feasible values
for P and {{E([u(t)], t 0 T]}, ( , '} are the feasible values for {E[u(t)], t 0 T}, where E([u(t)] / Iu(t)dP(.
The planner can solve the idealized problem if there exists a dominant treatment; that is, one solving all of
the problems max t 0 T E([u(t)], ( , '.  My concern is treatment choice when no dominant treatment exists.
Sections 3 through 5 differ in the information the planner possesses beyond knowledge of '.  In
Section 3, he places a subjective probability distribution on '.  In Section 4, he has no information beyond
knowledge of '.  In Section 5, he observes the treatment outcomes realized by a sample of the population.7
2.2. Choice Between a Status Quo Treatment and an Innovation
The basic concepts set forth above make plain the nature of the planner’s problem but are too abstract
to permit an entirely transparent analysis.  Hence, I repeatedly find it useful to consider a simple special case.
This is the problem of choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation.  It is sometimes realistic to
suppose that historical experience reveals the population mean outcome of the status quo treatment but not
that of the innovation.  Thus, the states of nature index the possible mean outcomes for the innovation.
Formally, there are two treatments, t = a denoting the status quo and t = b the innovation.  The mean
outcomes if the entire population were to receive one treatment are " / E[u(a)] and $ = E[u(b)] respectively.
The planner knows " and knows that $ lies in some set ($(, ( , ') of possible mean outcomes.
  Consider a rule that assigns a fraction . of the population to treatment b and the remaining 1 ! . to
treatment a.  The mean outcome under this rule is
(4)                                               "(1 ! .) + $.  =  " + ($ ! ")..
Social welfare is f[" + ($ ! ").].
The optimal treatment rule is obvious if (", $) are known.  The planner should choose . = 1 if $ >
" and . = 0 if $ < "; all values of . yield the same welfare if $ = ".  The problem of interest is treatment
choice when " is known but it is only known that $ , ($(, ( , ').
Problems of choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation occur often in practice.  In the
medical arena, the status quo may be a “standard” treatment for a health condition and the innovation may
be a new treatment proposed by medical researchers.  Historical experience administering the standard
treatment to populations of patients may have made its properties well understood.  In contrast, the safety and
efficacy of the proposed treatment may be uncertain, the available information deriving from biomedical
theorizing, animal studies, and small clinical trials with human subjects.  In such circumstances, public8
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States decide whether to approve
new treatments for administration to the population at large.  That done, medical practitioners collectively
decide whether the status quo treatment and the innovation should co-exist, each finding some application,
or whether the innovation should replace the status quo, taking its place as the standard treatment.
2.3. Specifying the Social Welfare Function
Consideration of planning problems where the objective is to maximize a population mean outcome
have been commonplace in public economics, from Bentham’s utilitarianism onward.  Yet there appears to
be no precedent for taking the social welfare function to be a nonlinear increasing function of a population
mean outcome, as I do here through the function f(@).  The reason is that previous research on social planning
has not had to specify the shape of f(@).  As noted in Section 2.1, researchers have assumed full knowledge
of the distribution of treatment response.  This makes the shape of f(@) immaterial.  Hence, economists have
found it convenient to suppose that f(@) is linear.
I cannot give a general prescription for specification of f(@).  Choice of a social welfare function must
depend on the context.  If I were the planner in the x-pox illustration, I likely would specify f(@) to be a
concave function that tends to !4 as the survival rate tends to zero.  Perhaps the log function would be
suitable, but I might want to use a function with more curvature, such as f(s) = – s
!2 or f(s) = – exp(1/s).  I
am not sure which particular function I would use, but the analysis of this paper makes clear that the choice
is consequential.  Whether a planner is Bayesian or applies the minimax-regret criterion, the shape of f(@)
affects treatment choice.
It is tempting to view the shape of f(@) as expressing social risk preferences, with linear f(@) expressing
risk neutrality and concave f(@) expressing risk aversion.  This perspective has a clear interpretation in
Bayesian planning, where linear f(@) implies indifference between mean-preserving spreads of a gamble and
concave f(@) implies a preference for gambles with smaller spreads.  Thinking of f(@) as social risk preferences9
is less well-grounded in minimax-regret planning; which does not use the probabilistic apparatus of expected
utility theory.  Hence, I do not associate the shape of f(@) with risk preferences in this paper.
3. Bayesian Planning
A Bayesian planner places a subjective probability distribution, say A, on the states of nature and
solves the problem
(5)                                               max z 0 Z  If[U(z, P()]dA.
In this way, a Bayes rule depends on the planner’s beliefs and the shape of f(@).
If f(@) is linear, problem (5) reduces to
(6)                                            max z 0 Z  3 t 0 T z(t)@EA[u(t)],
where EA[u(t)] / IE([u(t)]dA is the subjective expected value of E[u(t)].  Problem (6) is solved by assigning
the entire population to a treatment solving the problem 
(7)                                                        max t 0 T EA[u(t)].
Thus, a Bayesian planner with linear f(@) generically chooses a singleton rule.  Fractional rules are optimal
only when problem (7) has multiple solutions, in which case any mixture of these solutions is optimal.
If f(@) is nonlinear, the specific forms of A and f determine whether the solution to (5) is a singleton
or fractional rule.  It is difficult to reach conclusions in abstraction, so I focus on the choice between a status10
quo treatment and an innovation.  In this case, problem (5) becomes
(8)                                          max . 0 [0, 1] If[" + ($( ! ").]dA.
Proposition 1 shows that, given some regularity and substantive conditions, one can conclude whether the
solution to (8) is a singleton or fractional rule.
Proposition 1: Consider problem (8).  Let A be non-degenerate.  Let $A / I$(dA denote the subjective mean
of $.
(a) Let f(@) be strictly concave.  Then the Bayes rule is unique.  The solution is . = 0 if $A # ".
(b) Let f(@) be continuously differentiable. Let f(@) and A be sufficiently regular that
                       M{If[" + ($( ! ").]dA}/M.  =  I{Mf[" + ($( ! ").]/M.}dA
in a neighborhood of . = 0.  Then all solutions satisfy . > 0 if $A > ".  All solutions satisfy . , (0, 1) if $A
> " and If($()dA < f(").                                                                                                                               ~
Proof:
(a) Strict concavity of f(@) implies that the integral If[" + ($ ! ").]dA is strictly concave in ..  Hence,
problem (8) has a unique solution.  If . = 0, then If[" + ($( ! ").]dA = f(").  For each . > 0, f[" + ($( ! ").]
is strictly concave as a function of $(.  Hence, If[" + ($( ! ").]dA  <  f[" + ($A ! ").].  Hence, $A # "  Y
If[" + ($( ! ").]dA  < f(").
(b) {Mf[" + ($( ! ").]/M.}. = 0  =  ($( ! ")@[df(x)/dx]x = ".  It follows that {M{If[" + ($( ! ").]dA}/M.}. = 0  =
($A ! ")@[df(x)/dx]x = ".  By assumption, $A > " and [df(x)/dx]x = " > 0.  Hence, If[" + ($( ! ").]dA strictly11
increases with . in a neighborhood of . = 0, implying that solutions to (8) are positive.  If If($()dA < f("),
then . = 1 does not solve problem (8).  Hence,  solutions are fractional.
                                                                                                                                                              Q. E. D.
Observe that the concavity and differentiability restrictions placed on f(@) are used in different parts
of the proposition.  The proof of part (a) only uses the assumption that f(@) is strictly concave.  The proof of
part (b) only uses the assumption that f(@) is continuously differentiable and the stated regularity condition.
Also observe that, as in the x-pox problem, society may not be able to rely on decentralized decision
making to achieve the social optimum.  Suppose that persons makes their own treatment choices and that all
are Bayesian, with A the consensus subjective distribution on '.  Then all choose treatment a when $A <  "
and all choose b when $A > ".  Decentralized decision making may yield a fractional treatment allocation only
when $A = ", in which case persons are indifferent between the two treatments.
A Simple Special Case
A simple special case is amenable to complete analysis and sheds further light on the Bayes rule.  Let
f(@) be the log function, let ' contain the two elements {0, 1}, with $0 < " < $1, and let B / A(( = 0).  Then
(9)              If[" + ($( ! ").]dA  = B@log[" + ($0 ! ").]  +  (1 ! B)@log[" + ($1 ! ").].
The derivative of the left hand side with respect to . is
(10)    M{If[" + ($( ! ")@.]dA}/M.  =  B($0 ! ")/[" + ($0 ! ").]  + (1 ! B)($1 ! ")/[" + ($1 ! ").].
Inspection of the sign of this derivative shows when the Bayes rule is singleton or fractional.
Multiplication of the right hand side of (10) by the two positive terms in the denominators yields12
   B($0 ! ")[" + ($1 ! ").]  + (1 ! B)($1 ! ")[" + ($0 ! ").]  =  ($0 ! ")($1 ! ").  + "($A ! "),
where $A =  B$0 + (1 ! B)$1.  Observe that ($0 ! ")($1 ! ") < 0.  If $A # ", the sign of the derivative is
negative at all . , (0, 1]; hence, the Bayes rule sets . = 0 as shown in Proposition 1a.  If $A > ", the sign of
the derivative is positive in a neighborhood of . = 0; hence, the Bayes rule sets . > 0 as shown in Proposition
1b.  The derivative decreases with . and equals zero when
(11)                               .  =  "($A ! ")/*($0 ! ")($1 ! ")*.
If the right hand side of (11) is less than one, then the Bayes rule is fractional with this value of ..  Otherwise,
the Bayes rule sets . = 1.
Bayesian Planning with Sample Data
Suppose that the planner has sample data on treatment outcomes.  If he is Bayesian, the above
analysis applies as stated, with A being the planner’s subjective distribution given the sample data.
Statistical decision theorists have studied some interesting Bayesian planning problems with sample
data.  In particular, work on the design and analysis of randomized clinical trials has examined two-period
planning problems in which some members of a population are randomly assigned to treatments in the first
period and the experimental findings are used to inform treatment choice in the second period.  See, for
example, Canner (1970), Cheng, Su, and Berry (2003), and Dehejia (2005).
These contributions and (as far as I am aware) other studies of Bayesian planning have assumed
without comment that f(@) is linear.  Hence, research on Bayesian planning has taken for granted that Bayes
rules are singleton.  Proposition 1 shows that this is not necessarily the case when f(@) is nonlinear.13
3 The maximin rule is another criterion that uses no information beyond knowledge of '.  It calls for
solution of the problem sup z 0 Z inf ( 0 ' f[U(z, P()].  This rule is deservedly viewed as ultra-conservative.
Consider choice between a status quo treatment and innovation.  If there is any feasible state of nature in
which the innovation is inferior to the status quo, the maximin rule assigns the entire population to the latter.
4.  Minimax-Regret Planning
The minimax-regret criterion for treatment choice uses no information beyond the planner’s
knowledge that the actual state of nature lies in '.  The criterion is
(12)                                       inf z 0 Z  sup ( 0 ' f
*(P() ! f[U(z, P()].
Here, f
*(P() is the optimal social welfare achievable if it were known that P = P(; that is, by (3),
(13)                                       f
*(P()  / f{max t 0 T E([u(t)]}.
The quantity f
*(P() ! f[U(z, P()] is the regret of rule z in state of nature (; that is, the loss in social welfare
from not knowing the actual state of nature.
3
Manski (2005a, Chapter 2; 2005b) derived the minimax-regret rule when there are two treatments
and a planner with linear f(@) observes the actual treatment outcomes of a study population in which the
process of treatment selection is unknown.  This empirical evidence yields only partial knowledge of
treatment response because outcomes under counterfactual treatments are not observable.  I found that the
minimax-regret criterion yields a singleton rule only when one treatment weakly dominates the other, yielding
weakly higher social welfare in all states of nature and strictly higher welfare in some state of nature.  The
minimax-regret rule is fractional when both treatments are weakly undominated, each being better in some
state of nature.
I show here that the minimax-regret rule is generically fractional in problems with two undominated14
treatments.  The function f(@) need not be linear and missing outcome data need not be the reason why the
planner has partial knowledge of treatment response.  Let T = {a, b}.  Then the minimax-regret problem is
(14)           inf . 0 [0, 1]  sup ( 0 '   max {f{E([u(a)]}, f{E([u(b)]}}  !  f{(1 ! .)E([u(a)] + .E([u(b)]}.
Proposition 2 shows that solutions to (14) are fractional if a modest regularity condition holds.
Proposition 2: Let '(a) / {( 0 ': E([u(a)] $ E([u(b)]} and '(b) / {( 0 ': E([u(b)] $ E([u(a)]}.  Let
                     R(.; a)  /  sup ( 0 '(a)  f{E([u(a)]} ! f{(1 ! .)E([u(a)] + .E([u(b)]}
                     R(.; b)  /  sup ( 0 '(b)  f{E([u(b)]} ! f{(1 ! .)E([u(a)] + .E([u(b)]}
be the maximum regret of rule . on '(a) and '(b) respectively.  Suppose that R(@; a) and R(@; b) are
continuous on [0, 1].  Also suppose that both treatments are weakly undominated; that is, there exist states
of nature ( and (N such that E([u(a)] > E([u(b)] and E(N[u(a)] < E(N[u(b)].  Then problem (14) has a unique
solution, which lies in the open interval (0, 1).                                                                                            ~
Proof: The maximum regret of rule . on all of ' is max [R(.; a), R(.; b)].  As . increases from 0 to 1, R(@; a)
continuously increases from 0 to R(1; a) and R(@; b) continuously decreases from R(0; b) to 0.  The fact that
both treatments are weakly undominated implies that {R(1; a) > 0, R(0; b) > 0} and, moreover, that R(@; a)
and R(@; b) are strictly monotone functions of ..  Hence, the minimax-regret rule is the unique . 0 (0, 1) such
that R(.; a) = R(.; b).
                                                                                                                                                             Q. E. D.15
The basic idea underlying Proposition 2 is that singleton and fractional treatment rules have different
extremum properties across states of nature.  Each singleton rule is the best rule in some states of nature and
the worst in the others.  In contrast, fractional rules yield intermediate social welfare in all states of nature.
These facts suggest, but do not quite prove, that the minimax-regret rule must be fractional rather than
singleton.  To complete the proof requires some regularity in the behavior of R(@; a) and R(@; b); the
assumption that these functions are continuous suffices.
A Simple Special Case
Consideration of choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation sheds further light on the
minimax-regret rule.  Let ' contain the two elements {0, 1}, with $0 < " < $1.  Then the minimax-regret
problem is
(15)                  inf . 0 [0, 1]  max {f(") ! f{(1 ! .)" + .$0},  f($1) ! f{(1 ! .)" + .$1}}.
Let f(@) be continuous.  As . rises from 0 to 1, the first term inside the brackets increases strictly and
continuously from 0 to f(") ! f($0) and the second term similarly decreases from f($1) ! f(") to 0.  Hence,
the minimax-regret rule is the unique . 0 (0, 1) that equalizes the two terms, solving the equation
(16)                            f(") ! f{(1 ! .)" + .$0}  =  f($1) ! f{(1 ! .)" + .$1}.
The solution depends on the shape of f(@).  If f(@) is linear, the minimax-regret rule sets
(17)                                                  .   =   ($1 ! ")/($1 ! $0).16
If f(@) is the log function, the minimax-regret rule sets
(18)                                           .   =   "($1 ! ")/["($1 ! ") + $1(" ! $0)].
Comparison of (17) and (18) shows that a planner with linear f(@) allocates a larger fraction of the population
to treatment b than does one using the log transformation.  This illustrates that, although Proposition 2 shows
the minimax-regret rule is generically fractional, the specific fractional allocation varies with f(@).
Multiple Treatments
Does a result as broad and simple as Proposition 2 hold when there are more than two treatments?
The answer appears to be negative.  The proof of the proposition makes critical use of the fact that the
functions R(@; a) and R(@; b) cross exactly once as . increases from 0 to 1.  This single-crossing  property does
not hold when there are three or more treatments.
Although minimax-regret rules often are fractional, there exist non-trivial planning problems with
multiple treatments which have singleton minimax-regret rules.  Here is an example.  Let .
* denote the unique
minimax-regret rule determined in Proposition 2.  Now introduce a third treatment c, so the treatment set is
{a, b, c} rather than {a, b}.  Then the minimax-regret problem changes from (14) to
(19)                     inf z 0 Z  sup ( 0 '   max {f{E([u(a)]}, f{E([u(b)]}, f{E([u(c)]}}
                                                               !  f{z(a)E([u(a)] + z(b)E([u(b)] + z(c)E([u(c)]}.
Suppose that, in every state of nature, treatment c has the same mean outcome as rule .
*; thus, 
(20)                                    E([u(c)]  =  (1 ! .
*)E([u(a)] + .
*E([u(b)],          all ( 0 '.17
Then problem (19) reduces to
(21)                           inf z 0 Z  sup ( 0 '   max {f{E([u(a)]}, f{E([u(b)]}}
                                                               !  f{[z(a) + (1 ! .
*)z(c)]E([u(a)] + [z(b) + .
*z(c)]E([u(b)]}.
Problems (14) and (21) have the same structure.  Hence, there are multiple minimax-regret rules, each
satisfying the condition .
* = z(b) + .
*z(c).  Many fractional rules satisfy this condition and the singleton rule
[z(a) = 0, z(b) = 0, z(c) = 1] does as well.
This example obviously has a special structure.  In every state of nature, the welfare of treatment c
is intermediate between that of treatments a and b.  Hence, c is not weakly dominated and, moreover, there
exists no state of nature in which it is the unique best treatment.  Nevertheless, the example does demonstrate
that the behavior of minimax-regret rules can be more complex when there are multiple treatments than when
there are two treatments.
5. Treatment Choice with Sample Data
Suppose that the planner has sample data on treatment outcomes.  As observed earlier, the analysis
of Section 3 continues to apply as stated if the planner is Bayesian, with A being the planner’s subjective
distribution given the sample data.  Hence, it is only necessary here to consider how a non-Bayesian planner
might use sample data.
Wald (1950) introduced a frequentist version of statistical decision theory.  Wald’s idea is easy to
explain, but working out the implications for treatment choice can be rather difficult.  For this reason, I focus
on a simple special case analyzed in Manski (2005b, Chapter 3) and Manski and Tetenov (2005).  This18
4 The expressions statistical treatment rule and expected welfare are from Manski (2004).  In Wald’s
terminology, the former is a statistical decision function and the latter is the negative of risk.
concerns choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation when treatments have binary outcomes and
the data are the outcomes of an experiment assigning a random sample of subjects to the innovation.  Section
5.1 gives the general idea and Section 5.2 summarizes the findings for the special case.  Section 5.3 briefly
discusses research on other treatment-choice problems with sample data.
5.1. Generalities
Wald proposed that treatment rules be evaluated by their expected performance as the sampling
process is engaged repeatedly to draw independent data samples.  Let Q denote the sampling process and let
Q denote the sample space; that is, Q is the set of data samples that may be drawn under Q.  Let Z now denote
the space of functions that map T × Q into the unit interval and that satisfy the adding-up conditions: z 0 Z
Y  3 t 0 T z(t, R) = 1,  œ R 0 Q.  Then each z 0 Z defines a statistical treatment rule.
Repeated engagement of the sampling process to draw independent samples makes social welfare a
random variable.  In state of nature (, the expected welfare yielded by z in repeated samples is 
4
(22)        W(z, P(, Q()  /  I f{ 3 t 0 T  z(t, R)@E([u(t)]} dQ((R).
Rule z is said to be admissible if there exists no other rule that yields at least the expected welfare of z in all
states of nature and greater expected welfare in some state of nature; rule z is inadmissible otherwise.  There
is considerable consensus among statistical decision theorists that inadmissible rules should not be chosen.
There is no similar consensus on how to choose among the admissible rules, but one possibility is the finite-
sample minimax-regret criterion19
(23)    inf z 0 Z  sup ( 0 '   f
*(P() ! W(z, P(, Q().
This replaces the social welfare function f[U(z, P()] of the earlier minimax-regret criterion (12) with its
expected value W(z, P(, Q() across repeated samples.
5.2. Treatment Choice With Binary Outcomes Using Experimental Data on an Innovation
Consider the problem of choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation when treatments
have binary outcomes.  Let the sample data be the outcomes of an experiment assigning a random sample of
N subjects to the innovation.  Of these subjects, a number n experience outcome y(b) = 1 and the remaining
N ! n experience y(b) = 0.  Let the outcomes of all subjects be observed.  Treatment response distributions
are point-identified in this setting; partial knowledge of treatment response occurs only because the sample
size N is finite.
Let " = P[y(a) = 1] and $ = P[y(b) = 1] be the population success rates that would occur if all persons
were to receive treatment a or b respectively.  The sample size N indexes the sampling process and the
number n of experimental successes is a sufficient statistic for the sample data.  The feasible statistical
treatment rules are the functions .(@): [0, . . . , N] 6 [0, 1] that map the number of experimental successes into
a treatment allocation.  Thus, for each value of n, rule . allocates a fraction .(n) of the population to treatment
b and the remaining 1 ! .(n) to treatment a.
Let p(n; $) / N![n!@(N ! n)!]
!1$
n(1 ! $)
N!n denote the Binomial probability of n successes in N trials.
In state of nature (, the expected welfare yielded by rule .(@) across repeated samples is
                                                        N
(24)                      W(., $(, N)   /   3 p(n; $()@f["  + ($( ! ")@.(n)].
                                                      n = 0
It turns out that the admissibility of fractional and singleton rules depends on the shape of f(@).20
Linear f(@)
Manski (2005a, Chapter 3) considers the case in which f(@) is linear.  Then the expected welfare of
rule . in state of nature ( is
(25)                      W(., $(, N)   =   "  + ($( ! ")@E([.(n)],
where E([.(n)]  =  3 n p(n; $()@.(n).  In this setting, a theorem of Karlin and Rubin (1956) shows that the
admissible treatment rules are ones which assign all persons to the status quo treatment if the number of
experimental successes is below a specified threshold, all to the innovation if the success rate is above the
threshold, and permits a fractional allocation only if the number of experimental successes exactly equals the
threshold.  Karlin and Rubin called these rules monotone, but I will refer to them as KR-monotone.  Formally,
a KR-monotone treatment rule has the structure
(26)           .(n)  =  0    for n < k,
                 .(n)  =  8    for n = k,
                 .(n)  =  1    for n > k,
where k is any integer such that 0 # k # N and 8 is any real number such that 0 # 8 # 1.
Manski (2005, Proposition 3.1) applies Karlin and Rubin (1956, Theorem 4) to show that the
admissible and KR-monotone rules coincide if ($(, ( 0 ') contains values that are smaller and larger than "
but excludes the extreme values 0 and 1.  This is a striking result.  It says that if f(@) is linear, statistical
treatment rules are inadmissible if they are fractional at more than one value of n.
A particular consequence is that the finite-sample minimax-regret rule, which is necessarily
admissible, is KR-monotone.  In contrast, Proposition 2 showed that the minimax-regret rule not using sample
data is generically fractional.  This difference in findings is intriguing but is open to two interpretations.  One21
might interpret the difference as showing that, from the minimax-regret perspective, even small randomized
experiments qualitatively alter treatment choice relative to the case with no data at all.  Or one might interpret
it as showing that the finite-sample minimax-regret criterion is not so obvious an extension of the basic
minimax-regret idea as it might seem at first inspection.
Concave f(@)
The Karlin and Rubin theorems do not apply when f(@) is nonlinear, but a weaker notion of
monotonicity remains relevant if f(@) is concave.  Define a fractional monotone rule to be one in which the
fraction of the population assigned to the innovation weakly increases with the experimental success rate.
Manski and Tetenov (2005) show that the class of fractional monotone rules is essentially complete if f(@) is
concave.  That is, given any rule which is not fractional monotone, there exists a fractional monotone rule
which performs at least as well in all feasible states of nature.
Investigating particular treatment rules, we find that Bayes rules and the minimax-regret rule depend
on the curvature of f(@).  These rules are KR-monotone if the curvature is sufficiently weak, but they deliver
interior fractional treatment allocations if the curvature is sufficiently strong.  If f(@) has sufficient curvature
and # contains positive values arbitrarily close to 0, the minimax-regret rule never assigns the entire
population to treatment b. 
5.3. Other Treatment-Choice Problems
Outside of the setting of Section 5.2, there have been only a few non-Bayesian studies of treatment
choice with sample data, and these have all assumed that f(@) is linear.
The Karlin-Rubin result cited above does not require that treatments have binary outcomes, but it
does require that outcome distributions have the monotone-likelihood-ratio (MLR) property.  Bernoulli
distributions have the MLR property, so this requirement is unrestrictive when outcomes are binary.22
However, distributions with the MLR property are special when outcomes can take more than two values.
Manski (2004), Stoye (2005), and Hirano and Porter (2005) study minimax-regret treatment choice
when there are two treatments with unknown outcome distributions and a randomized experiment provides
data on the outcomes of both treatments.  Manski (2004) assumes that outcomes have bounded support and
derives an upper bound on the finite-sample maximum regret of empirical-success rules that use sample
average outcomes to estimate population mean outcomes.  Stoye (2005) assumes that outcomes are binary
and shows that a particular empirical-success rule is finite-sample minimax-regret.  He also provides a partial
analysis of cases in which outcomes have bounded support.  Hirano and Porter (2005) use the Le Cam
asymptotic version of Wald’s statistical decision theory to study a class of problems in which the researcher
may have some a priori knowledge of the treatment outcome distributions.  They find that empirical success
rules are asymptotic minimax-regret, in the Le Cam sense, when the researcher has no a priori knowledge of
the outcome distributions.
Whereas the above research assumes that the available data are from a randomized experiment,
Manski (2005a, Chapter 4; 2005b) considers treatment choice using observational data when treatments were
selected in an unknown way.  In this case, outcome distributions are partially identified.  I show that a
treatment rule estimating certain point-identified population means by their sample analogs is finite-sample
minimax-regret.
6. Implementing Fractional Treatment Rules
The treatment-choice problems examined in this paper, while hardly exhaustive, give ample reason
for a planner to consider fractional rules.  The standard practice in research on social planning has been to
assume that the choice set only contains singleton rules.  This is inconsequential in the idealized problem of
Section 2.1 and in similar settings where the planner knows the population distribution of treatment response.23
However, partial knowledge of treatment response may make fractional rules preferable to singleton ones.
As shown in Sections 3 through 5, the specifics depend on the planner’s information and on the shape of f(@).
The notion of a planner who acts on behalf of society is a useful fiction that greatly simplifies
analysis of collective decision problems.  Nevertheless, if the findings of this paper are to have practical value
in functioning democracies, we must ultimately consider the feasibility of implementing fractional treatment
rules in such societies.
A possible ethical objection to fractional rules is that they violate the normative principle calling for
“equal treatment of equals.”  Fractional rules violate this principle if one interprets “equal treatment” to
require that observationally identical persons receive the same element of the choice set T.  However,
fractional rules are consistent with the principle if it is enough for observationally identical people to have
equal probabilities of receiving particular treatments.
Democracies occasionally accept the probabilistic interpretation in the design of major policies, such
as random drug testing, calls for jury service, and the American Green Card and Vietnam draft lotteries.  They
routinely accept it when they permit the conduct of randomized clinical trials.  Indeed, the prevailing standard
of medical ethics permits randomized trials only when partial knowledge of treatment response prevents a
determination that one treatment is superior to another.  The open question is whether democracies would
accept broader application of the idea that, when knowledge of treatment response is incomplete, “equal
treatment of equals” can ethically be probabilistic rather than deterministic.
A political argument in support of fractional rules is that they convexify collective problems of
treatment choice.  Political processes often find it difficult to make discrete choices among alternative
singleton rules, each of which may be favored by a different segment of the population.  Fractional rules open
opportunities for compromise, transforming a problem of discrete choice into one of continuous choice among
alternative fractional allocations.
Political considerations may also favor application of the minimax-regret criterion rather than a Bayes
rule.  Determination of a Bayes rule requires specification of a subjective distribution on the states of nature,24
but different segments of the population may disagree in their beliefs.  In contrast, the existence of a
consensus  minimax-regret rule requires only that the population agree on the feasible states of nature.
It may be that, in some circumstances, enabling the population to trade their assigned treatments
would increase public acceptance of fractional rules. During the American Civil War, draftees were permitted
to hire substitutes to fulfill their military service. In recent times, various countries have established emissions
trading systems for control of pollution, where firms are permitted to trade government-determined pollution
endowments. Future research should explore the implications of treatment trading for social welfare.
To conclude, I suggest a specific aspect of American public policy that seems well-suited for
implementation of fractional rules.  This is the drug approval process of the Food and Drug Administration.
The present process essentially makes a binary choice between unconstrained approval and total disapproval
of a new drug.  With only these two options on the table, the FDA sets a high bar for approval, requiring that
the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals demonstrate “substantial evidence of effect” for their products (see
Gould, 2002).  It may be preferable to implement a fractional approval process setting a knowledge-dependent
ceiling on the production and marketing of new drugs—the stronger the evidence of effect, the higher the
ceiling.25
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